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INTRODUCTION
While there is a considerable body of research indicating that national and state/province tax structures can affect business growth (see literature surveys in (Bartik, 1991; 1992; Buss, 2001; McGuire, 2003) ) there is less evidence on the effectiveness of municipal tax structures. The question naturally arises as to whether reductions in municipal taxes can effectively increase economic activity and create jobs. The answer is not obvious. On one hand, such taxes are perceived as small relative to state/province and national taxes, and therefore unimportant at the margin to decision makers. On the other hand, since adjoining municipalities are often very similar in terms of markets and infrastructure, differences in tax structures might be salient, an argument made by business communities in higher-taxed cities. 1 As discussed in the next section, while some studies of European cities have found that local taxes can matter, U.S. based studies thus far have not been broadly generalizable.
The topic addressed here is of policy importance not only because it may guide local lawmakers, but because it gets to the question of whether taxes matter. Because city level taxes are among the smallest, the findings that taxes matter here adds support for the importance of taxes in other settings. Another important policy issue relates to the efficacy of incentives. As pointed out by Bartik (1991) local incentives have become increasingly prevalent, yet their net social benefits are not clear in all cases. To the extent levels of city business taxes reflect incentives, the findings here are suggestive of whether lower taxes should be sought by local lawmakers.
1 For typical examples in the U.S. see "LA Officials Move Closer to Reducing Tax on Gross Receipts" (LA Times, January 26 2015);"Philly's Dubious Wage Tax Just wide variation, consider these examples. Akron, Ohio, has a 2.5% tax on gross payroll plus a 2.5% income tax on firms that pay a state income tax; Baton Rouge, Louisiana has a .1% tax on gross receipts (maximum tax of $2000), except that retail has a separate tax structure (maximum tax of $7500); Jacksonville, Florida has a $5 per employee tax, but retailers and wholesalers have a separate tax structure. Many cities have taxes with no maximums, such as New York City's income tax and Los Angeles' gross receipts tax.
Other business taxes, licenses, and fees also vary widely. Other business taxes include taxes on public utility gross receipts, occupancy taxes for hotel guests, parking taxes, etc. Business licenses and fees can include general and specific activity licenses, construction fees and permits, development impact fees, environmental impact fees, scheduled traffic impact fees, signalization fees, art in public places fees, major thoroughfare/bridge fees, utility user fees and taxes, etc. 4 The sheer variation in such business taxes makes any sort of marginal rate calculation seemingly impossible. Accordingly, deriving an average effective rate seems more sensible.
To establish some perspective on whether municipal business taxes, licenses, and fees are potentially important to businesses, it is necessary first to examine their overall economic significance. To do this, tax revenues at a detailed level, by city, were collected from the Census of Local Governments (Bureau of the Census, various years) for 1998 through 2011. 5 From this data, taxes, fees, and licenses imposed on business were isolated. Since larger cities will typically have larger tax collections, it is necessary to scale such collections to gauge their relative importance.
We can scale business taxes/licenses/fees as a percent of total city tax collections, and we can also develop an overall, average effective business tax/license/fee rate.
To develop this latter statistic, I divide municipal business tax/license/fee collections 6 for each state by state -business income‖ for that year. Business income is proprietors' incomes for that state and year reported by the 2 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level data is an agglomeration of adjoining incorporated cities. In many cases the data also includes unincorporated areas outside of city borders. 3 The US Postal Office (USPO) has a file of all US zip codes which indicate, among other things, zip codes in terms of belonging to a single city ("primary city") versus multiple cities, the latter of which is denoted as "acceptable city". Zip codes which also had an acceptable city were deemed multicity, and eliminated. 4 Fees are distinguishable from taxes insofar as they are voluntary. On the other hand, since businesses must pay them to engage in their regular activities, the impacts of fees are much the same as taxes. 5 There were 19,519 incorporated municipalities and 16,360 townships in this data source. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This measure is similar to the one used by Wheaton (1983) to derive effective business tax rates at the state level. As alternative measures, we can divide business taxes/fees by the number of business establishments in the state (derived from Census' County Business Patterns), divide business taxes/fees by total tax collections for each city, or divide such taxes by city population. For 2003-11, average rates were 8.835%
as a percent of total city taxes, and 3.947% as a percent of business incomes. Since state corporate income tax rates average below 7%, these numbers are significant.
It is important to note that the foregoing business tax/license/fee measures exclude two potentially significant taxes--property and sales--which given the aggregate nature of data reported, we cannot reliably apportion to the business sector versus the individual sector. 7 On the other hand, we can estimate the economic impacts of property and sales taxes econometrically, as discussed later.
Alternative Measures of Business Taxes
Examining the impact of taxes on business activity by using overall tax rates might be theoretically preferable to using statutory rates. However, such overall rates use business activity as a divisor, so regressing business activity on these rates creates an artificially negative relationship between it and any dependent variable based on business activity. Moreover, there is a potential endogeneity problem; it may be that cities adjust their tax/license/fee rates in response to business activity. For example, cities experiencing lagging business growth may lower rates; conversely, cities with a healthy and growing business sector may increase business taxes in times of revenue needs. I address this with two alternative measures of business tax. The first is to examine the existence of a city business tax structure (including an income tax) based on activity. Although the rates at which such taxes are imposed can fluctuate to some degree, their existence tends to stable over time. In fact, for the over 800 cities examined here, the existence of such taxes changed for very few of the cities over the time period examined. Thus, if we measure the existence of such taxes in the form of a dummy variable, it is arguable that there is no endogeneity with this variable and observed business activity.
This variable is not reported in any comprehensive data source. 8 Instead, individual city web sites were examined as portals to further information as to city business tax structures. Information on such structures were contained in -doing business‖ sections of the websites, and further research eventually led to actual laws themselves.
To see if such structures changed, actual city laws were examined. This was a very labor-intensive task made slightly easier by: 1. not examining changes in rates per se across time, and instead focusing on whether a tax existed and its general structure; and 2. focusing on cities having populations of over 40 thousand (as of 2010).
Although such rates did change somewhat, tax structures-whether a tax existed, and if so, whether it was based on gross receipts, employees/payroll, square footage, or a flat fee, rarely changed. 9 Here, we can assign a dummy variable set to one if a city has any tax at all, and if such a tax exists, we can assign a series of dummy variables based on the type of tax. Such dummy variables do not indicate whether the city imposes other taxes, fees, or licenses, and as such measures only the presence or absence of a general business tax based on economic activity (including an income tax). However, the general business tax typically accounts for over half of the total business taxes imposed by cities (excluding property and sales taxes), and is easily the most visible tax to businesses.
out to be business taxes and fees). Although businesses also pay property and sales taxes, the aggregate data reported by Cen sus does not break these taxes out into those paid by businesses versus individuals. Note that because the publicly-available Census dataset is aggregated at the state level, I requested and received under the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) detailed data for all sub-state governments. 7 The magnitudes of property and sales tax collections are significant, averaging 46.7 percent and 24.2 percent, respectively, of city tax collections.
8 Even on-line tax research databases provided by Commerce Clearing House (CCH), RIA, etc., only provide business tax information for c ertain large cities. 9 I examined city charters/legislation/constitutions for as far back as was available to look for any structural changes. For many cities, such structural change required a major change to its city laws requiring legislative approval-certainly not an easy legislative task, especially compared to simple rate changes. One notable such change was for San Francisco which phased in a gross receipts tax (from an employee-based tax) starting in 2011. The second approach is to attempt to measure overall business taxes in a way which might not be mechanically related to any dependent variable, nor be endogenous to it. Here, I develop a business tax rate where overall business taxes are divided by city population. Next, I take the average of this rate over the twelve years examined here. Finally, I categorize such rates into quartiles. Thus, the measure broadly characterizes cities into very low to high tax categories. Here, we may be able to quantify tax effects more generally, without the potential of mechanical/endogenous relations ships to economic activity variables used as dependent variables in regressions. 10
Model and Control Variables
In examining whether city taxes have an economic impact, we of course want to control for trends and potentially unobserved variables that could affect business activity. We can attempt to control for such trending and other effects with a fixed effects regression specification as follows:
Where Zit=(Yit -Yit-1)/(Yit-1), and Yi is employment (or the number of establishments) for zip code i in year t, BT is a vector of dummy variables set to 1 for existence of city business tax structures (or levels of overall business taxes) 11 , in zip code i in year t (and 0 otherwise), and t  , s  and c  are fixed effects for year, state, and county (a series of dummy variables). In this specification, the dependent viable is the percent change in employment (or establishments), which has the effect of controlling for size effects.
The it i   term represents control variables from Census (lagged by one year). These include the log of population; the log of personal income; and non debt-service city expenditures per capita 12 . The latter is intended to proxy for the level of services that a city offers. 13 Unfortunately, given the level of data publicly available which would cover all cities in the sample, I cannot reliably separate such services into those which would strictly benefit businesses (or their owners). The NEARBY variable indicates that there are nearby zip codes which have no taxes (i.e., it is in a different city, and that city has no taxes on business activity). The idea is that where a nearby location has a favorable tax structure and is reasonably close, this gives that location a comparative disadvantage (or at least no disadvantage, if it is in a city with no tax). See Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) who find that nearby favorablytaxed states have an effect on state employment, and Holmes (1998) who examines similar state border effects in the case of adjoining states which have (or do not have) -right to work‖ laws. Although there is no known database to show which zip codes are closest to city borders (zip codes, as well as cities, have very irregular borders), we can estimate which such zips are in fact border areas, by examining distances between any two pairs of zip codes 14 ; distances between all pairs of zip codes within ten digits of each other were then calculated, and if the adjacent ZIP
10
Other jurisdictions besides cities (counties, school districts, etc.) can impose taxes on businesses. Since the purpose here is to examine whether cities' tax policies have an effect on economic activity, these taxes might be properly be included as control variables here. Unfortunately, the only source of such data is collected and calculated by the Lincoln Land Institute, which gathers such data for only the largest 150 cities. See http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/fiscally-standardized-cities.
11
These are not lagged since they are constants across time, with a few exceptions. See discussion in text on how the BT variables are measured.
12
See for examples of control variables used in state tax based studies. Unfortunately, regularly-collected variables at the city level are less common. For example, educational attainment, age, etc. are infrequently collected by Census. With regard to industry dummies, Census only reports broad employment ranges by NAICS codes which provides for very noisy measures of employment.
13
See Gabe and Bell (2004) . 14 The distance between any two pairs of zip codes can be calculated based on latitude and longitude data reported by the U.S. P ost Office (USPO) data base of zip codes. This data reports latitude and longitude for the centroid of every U.S. zip code. For any two such data points, we use the fo llowing formula (from any standard geography text): distance=ACOS (SIN(Lat1)*SIN(Lat2)+COS(Lat1)*COS(Lat2)*COS(Lon2-Lon1))*3443.89849, where latitude and longitude data is degree and minute data reported by the USPO and is converted into radians using the formula: radians= ((Degrees*3600+Minutes*60+Seconds)/3600).
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© 2016 Conscientia Beam. All Rights Reserved. was in a different city and had no business tax, this was scored a -1‖ (and zero otherwise). Next, the average distance to such adjacent cities was then multiplied by the dummy variable to obtain a composite score based on distance and tax structure. Essentially a higher score indicated that the ZIP was further away from a nearby city (or cities) with no business tax, which gave it an advantage. Although scores varied widely, in many cases this ten ZIP code -circle‖ encompassed entire metro areas for smaller and medium sized cities. 
RESULTS
Before discussing the econometric results, it is instructive to discuss the effects of business taxes. Such taxes are expected to have cash flow and a -behavioral‖ effects. The former means that the tax-in any form assessedreduces cash available to the firm for investment and, in the case of firms at the edge, exit from the market. The behavioral effect assumes that firms are cognizant of the tax and act accordingly in terms of expansion, location choices, etc. The behavioral effects resulting from different forms of taxation might be expected to vary. For example, a tax on employees/payroll increases the cost of labor which may cause less employment. Tax on square footage is essentially a tax on capital, which may cause downsizing of facilities. Flat taxes, and taxes on gross receipts or net income have no such obvious factor choice effects. Since our outcome variables here are employment and number of establishments, clearly a tax on employment/payroll should reduce employment. Other forms of tax may have an employment-reducing effect indirectly due to lower cash available to pay employees, or due to decisions to locate in a lower-taxed city. With regard to effects on the number of establishments, clearly taxes on factors of production (employees/payroll, or square footage) induce economic inefficiencies which can exacerbate profitability/cash flow effects of taxes and lead to firms avoiding/exiting the city, or failing altogether. Also, firms making location choice decisions may avoid creating an establishment in taxed cities (due to cash flow effects) in favor of a nearby city with no such taxes. All specifications show that control variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant, including the NEARBY variable. All models show a statistically significant reduction in establishment growth as a result of business taxes. Model 1 shows that existence of a business tax reduces growth rates in establishments by .3%, and this effect is significant at .001. Model 2 shows that tax structures based on gross receipts, employment, and income all reduce establishment growths, all significant at .001. The average of the effects of these three taxes is also about .3%. On the other hand, taxes based on square footage or flat rates have no effect.
Model 3, which uses an overall effective tax rate broken into splines, shows statistically significant effects for the lowest and highest levels of tax. When a city's average effective rate goes from the lowest level to the next highest level, growth in establishments declines by 20%. At the highest level of effective rate, establishment growth rates were approximately .8% lower. 16
15 In particular, removal of the city expenditures (sans debt payments) variable had no qualitative effects on the regressions. This is important due to the potential for this variable to be endogenously related to business tax levels. 16 To avoid perfect collinearity the omitted group is the lowest level of tax. Table 3 shows regression results at the ZIP code level for the growth in employment for three specifications of the model in (1). Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White fixup, and Durbin
Watson statistics indicate no effects of serial correlation in the error terms. As with the establishment regressions, the first specification has a single dummy variable for existence of a city business tax; the second breaks the single tax variable out into flat taxes, net income taxes, and taxes based on gross receipts, employment/payroll, and square footage; and the third uses the overall effective business tax rate variable. All specifications show that control variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant, including the NEARBY variable. Similar to the establishment regressions, all models show a statistically significant reduction in establishment growth as a result of business taxes. Model 1 shows that existence of a business tax reduces growth rates in employment by .2%, and this effect is significant at .001. Model 2 shows that tax structures based on gross receipts and employment reduce employment growth, and the average of the effects of these taxes is also about .2%. On the other hand, taxes based on square footage or flat rates have no effect. Income taxes have a negative coefficient but it is not statistically significant. Model 3, which uses an overall effective tax rate broken into splines, shows statistically significant effects for the lowest and highest levels of tax. When a city's average effective rate goes from the lowest level to the Overall, findings suggest that city business taxes do have a negative impact on the number of establishments and employment in a city. This effect is consistently negative for cities with taxes on employment/payroll and on gross receipts. However, the estimated impacts are economically small. For example, averaging across Table 2 and 3 coefficients, existence of a business tax reduces the number establishments by .3 percent, and employment by .2 percent. For an average city of 75 thousand employees, this implies that presence of a city tax costs about 150 jobs.
For a larger city of 1 million employees, this would be approximately 2000 jobs. Because of the spline nature of the measure used here, estimating the effects of overall business tax rates is more complex. However, because we observe the strongest effects at the lower levels of tax (i.e., when we go from an almost negligible level to a low level), one possibility is that existence of taxes signals a lack of business-friendliness.
17 Untabulated similar results occur for all regressions when establishment and employment is at the aggregate city level, although the power of such tests is slightly lower due to less observations. There are 18,864 "cities" in the data base, and 41,898 zip codes, so on average, each city has approximately 2.25 zip codes. Of course, this is just an average, and is influenced by many small cities. Larger cities have more (in our 803 cities having over 40,000 populations, these cities average about 10 zip codes each).
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Overall, we also see consistently negative impacts on establishments and employment the farther away we go from bordering (competing) cities with a favorable tax structure (e.g., no taxes on business). The effects of nearby cities is broadly consistent with those of Holmes (1998) finding that bordering states' right to work laws affected business growth, and Chrinko and Wilson (2008) finding of zero-sum investments across states (using matched counties) due to state corporate tax structures.
Diagnostic Analysis
Potential effects of local sales and property taxes, and endogeneity, using a sample state Cities impose sales and property taxes on businesses, neither of which were included in the regressions. The foregoing regressions, using fixed effects for year, county, and state, attempts to control for such omitted variables, but it is possible that the omission of these two taxes, despite fixed effects, bias the business tax rate coefficient. The salience to businesses of sales taxes is unknown; businesses pay them on certain purchases, although if the purchased items are resold or are otherwise part of a resold product, there is no tax. Moreover, some states do not impose a sales tax (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon), and while such taxes typically add a county component to the state rate, not all cities add their own tax. 18 As with sales taxes, the salience of property taxes to business is unknown; such taxes are imposed on business personalty (equipment, furniture and fixtures, etc.) which at higher levels may be a disincentive. Higher real estate tax rates may discourage commercial construction. For leased commercial/industrial properties, an incidence identification problem may occur for property taxes; in theory they are in part passed onto local business tenants through higher rents, but they may also end up being borne by real estate owners who are located outside of the city.
Since the only state for which I have tax rate data is California, I perform an analysis using this state. 19 To address potential endogeneity issues, I first construct instrumental variables for sales and property tax rates then run the regressions. 20 Regression results after these IV measures are shown in Panel B of Appendix Table A1 .
Neither the sales tax nor the property tax IVs have statistically-significant impacts on establishments or employment, and the business tax coefficients are negative and generally similar to those reported in Tables 3 and   4 .
18 Certain states do not follow the "home rule" concept and prohibit cities from imposing certain types of their own taxes. 19 The only commercially-available database of sales and property tax rates by city, on a time series basis, is the Kosmont-Rose Institute Cost of Doing Business Survey (available at Roseinstitute.org), published annually by the Rose Institute at Claremont-McKenna College. This report is an annual survey of all California cities that collects data on taxes imposed by the city at a fairly specific level, tax and non-tax incentives offered, and certain other data that might be useful to a business considering locating to a particular city. It is the only time series database of such specific tax and incentive data at the municipal level. However, except for one year, the Survey collected data only for California cities; accordingly I can perform tests of sales and property taxes using only California cities. Using such data from 2000 through 2010, sales tax rates had a mean of 9.061%, with maximum (minimum) of 10.8% (6.7%). Property tax rates had a mean of 1.52%, with a maximum (minimum) of 5.61% (1.00%).
20 It may be (due to budgetary considerations) cities adjust such rates in conjunction with business tax policy as part of an overall policy. To address the first problem I create instrumental variables (IVs) from sales and property tax rates, from regressions creating predicted values of both which use variables not correlated with other variables in the business tax rate regressions. Following Luna, Bruce and Hawkins (2007) . who examine cities in Tennessee, I model sales tax rates for city i at time t as a function of sales tax capacity, sales tax effort, expenditures per capita (lagged), and population growth. Tax capacity is the city's ability to raise taxes compared to other cities in the same state, which is the city's tax base (from Census data) times the average state sales tax rate, divided by the state average of the same number. Tax effort is the intensity with which the city taxes the base, and is calculated as the tax rate for city i in year t divided by the average for its state in the same period. The regression also includes expenditures per capita and population growth (both from Census data), which proxy for revenue needs . In the same spirit, I model property tax rates as functions of property tax capacity, property tax effort, expenditures per capita (lagged), and population growth, where tax capacity and tax effort are measured similarly to their sales tax counterparts (except with property tax data) and are derived from Census and Kosmont-Rose data. I orthogonolize the IVs from these first stage regressions by regressing the property tax IV on the sales tax IV and the business tax rate variable, and use the residual from this second stage regression as the final IV for property tax rates. Similarly, I regress the sales tax IV on the business tax variable and use the residual as the fina l IV for sales tax rates. Although only one state, the above analyses are nonetheless instructive since California contains about 15% of the cities in this paper's sample, with a wide variety of city sizes and tax structures.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
There is little research on whether municipal level tax policy can attract or repel business in U.S. cities.
Although such taxes are perceived as small relative to state and Federal taxes and therefore unimportant at the margin to decision makers, because adjoining municipalities are often very similar in terms of markets and infrastructure, differences in tax structures might be salient. This study first documents municipal business taxes, licenses, and fees across the United States, and finds they are a relatively significant cost to business. Next, using very precise zip code level data across all states over a long time period, I find that activity-based city business taxes generally have a statistically significant negative impact on city employment and the number of establishments.
This effect is most pronounced if the city has a tax on employment/payroll, or on gross receipts. I also find that if a city is bordered by other cities with more favorable tax structures (e.g., no taxes), there is a reduction in establishments and employment. Finally, control variables show that levels of city spending can create a more desirable location and thus have some countervailing effects on higher tax rates.
The policy implications are as follows. For many cities, much of their revenue sources are out of their control; sales and property tax revenues are remitted by counties, and such revenues are also at the mercy of economic fluctuations. Actual tax sources controlled by cities (excluding fees and fines) such as business taxes are relatively few, 23 so simply getting rid of business taxes is quite risky. While such taxes do have employment-and establishment-reducing effects, such effects are modest, so city decision-makers may consider such job losses acceptable in light of budget constraints with the potential for cuts in city services. Instead, reductions in rates of taxation may be a more reasonable choice. Also, decision-makers should consider the method of taxation; results shown here clearly indicate that taxes on employment/payroll and gross receipts have the clearest negative effects 21 Since I only have sales and property tax rates for California (see discussion above), the analysis is based on that state.
22 I include revenue needs (current and lagged city total expenditures, CTE, from the aforementioned Census data), alternative sources of revenues (sales tax, STR, and personal property tax rates, PTR), growth in state personal incomes (STPIRG current and lagged, also from Census data), as well as effects of nearby cities (i.e., whether the city would chose to have a business tax in light of competition for business, where DIST=distance in miles between city centers). 23 In my examination of census data and city budgets, I found that an increasing number of cities are generating own -source revenues through hotel occupancy taxes.
Here, hotels charge guests a city tax. This tax may be relatively politically palatable insofar as hotel guests from outside the city cannot vote to reduce to get rid of such a tax.
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on business. In contrast, flat taxes have no clear negative effects; cities may wish to utilize these, perhaps with some general levels of tax based on broad size categories. Finally, to the extent overall local tax rates reflect incentives, the results here are suggestive as to the efficacy of such incentives (see Bartik (2005) who points out a dearth of research in this area).
One limitation of this study is not controlling for the potential effects of tax shifting. 24 That is, firms may be able to shift some of business taxes forward to consumers or backward to labor. Of course, this ability depends on market structure, e.g., firms operating in perfectly competitive markets would have only limited ability to shift.
Unfortunately, data on prices at the city level is limited so such tests do not appear feasible here.
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